Introduction
Spain has undergone fundamental changes in the role and effectiveness of the public sector since the transition to a democratic system after the death of General Francisco Franco in 1975. These very significant changes in Spanish society during the last 30 years offer an opportunity to examine citizens' attitudes toward paying taxes -what is sometimes termed their "tax morale," or the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes -and especially to analyze the ways in which these attitudes are affected by (or reflected in) changes in government policies and institutions. In this paper we use survey data from two sources: the World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Values Survey (EVS), which allow us to observe the evolution of tax morale in Spain at four benchmark years : 1981, 1990, 1995, and 1999/2000 . Although these years do not coincide with any particular key event in the recent history of Spain, they cover a period long enough to incorporate many of the important reforms of the Spanish public sector.
The study of the evolution of tax morale in modern Spain is particularly interesting because it provides close to a natural experiment setting. Constitutional and political changes after Franco died in 1975 and the advent of a fully democratic state, deep tax policy and tax administration reforms, a significant push for decentralization, joining the European Community and so on provide excellent benchmarks for institutional changes that are expected in the compliance literature to change tax morale.
The issue of tax morale in Spain so far has attracted little attention in the literature. To our knowledge there have not been many previous studies in this area. In an interesting recent paper Prieto Rodriguez et al. (2005) analyze the status of tax morale throughout the Spanish regions (Comunidades Autónomas) using cross-section data for 1998 from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). Their most significant finding is the important role played by political or ideological factors in explaining variations in tax morale across the Spanish regions. In particular, tax morale is especially low among the supporters of the nationalist regional parties in Catalonia and the Basque Country, who may feel disenfranchised from the central government in Madrid. In another study, investigate in a cross-country analysis tax morale differences between the USA and Spain and find similar results obtained in experiments that reported a higher tax compliance in the USA. Finally, Molero and Pujol (2005) investigate the determinants of tax morale using a sample of university students covering 617 observations. Their results indicate that individuals' perceived grievance has a strong impact on tax morale. Interestingly, they also investigate grievance in relative terms finding strong support for the proposition that higher perceived tax evasion levels lead to decreases in tax morale, a result that is consistent with previous findings in this literature (see Frey and Torgler 2004 , Torgler and Schneider 2005 ).
In contrast to these studies, in this paper we focus on the inter-temporal evolution of
tax morale in the country and use panel data to analyze individual responses from different sources, the World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Values Survey (EVS).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section two we briefly review the issue of tax morale in the literature. Section three provides an overview of institutional change in Spain, with a focus on the fiscal system, from the death of General Franco to present times, with the view to provide a background for external factors that may have affected the tax morale of ordinary citizens. Section four describes the available data on the level of tax morale in Spain used in this paper. Section five examines the evolution of the aggregated proxy of tax morale in Spain. Section six presents an econometric analysis of the individual determinants of tax morale in Spain. Section seven offers some concluding comments.
A brief review of the tax morale literature
Some researchers have argued that tax morale-the intrinsic motivation one has to pay his/her tax-can help to explain the high degree of tax compliance observed in many countries (e.g., Schwartz and Orleans 1967 , Lewis 1982 , Roth, Scholz and Witte 1989 , Alm et al. 1992 , 1999 , Pommerehne, Hart and Frey 1994 , Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann 1996 , Frey 1997 , Frey and Feld 2002 , Feld and Tyran 2002 , Torgler 2006a . If tax morale is thought to be an explanation for why tax compliance rates are so high, it would be of interest to analyse what may shape tax morale among taxpayers. Surprisingly, however, there is very little evidence available on this topic. Feld and Tyran (2002, p. 199) , for example, argue: "All in all, too little is known about which motivations of citizens shape tax morale."
More than 100 years ago, Georg von Schanz (1890) stressed the relevance of taking taxpayers as partners in the tax contract between the state and its citizens. Sixty years later, the German 'Cologne school of tax psychology' conducted surveys and tried to measure tax morale among taxpayers (see Schmölders 1952 , 1960 , 1962 , Strümpel 1969 . These researchers tried to lay the bridge between economics and social psychology, emphasizing that economic phenomena should not only be analyzed from the traditional narrow economic point of view. They saw tax morale as an important and integral attitude that was related to tax non-compliance (see, Schmölders 1960) . A certain amount of preliminary research on tax morale was conducted during the 1950s and 1960s by the 'Cologne school of tax psychology', but since that time the concept of tax morale has been largely neglected by tax researchers. A number of contemporary researchers studying tax compliance have mentioned the concept of tax morale in their papers or books (e.g., Lewis 1982 , Vogel 1974 , but only a few have examined tax morale in any detail (see for example, Kirchler 1997 , 1999 , 2005a , 2005b , 2006a , 2006b ).
An overview of institutional change in Spain
Because we want to study the evolution of tax morale in Spain during much of the transition to democracy it is important to have an understanding of the institutional changes the country has gone through during all of this period with the potential of affecting the level of tax morale of ordinary citizens.
The last 30 years represent a period of radical transformation for Spain, which could have affected profoundly the way citizens view the state and ultimately their tax morale. The state of tax morale was quite low at the end of Franco's regime. As reported by Comin (2005) at the end of the 1970s tax evasion in Spain was estimated at 40 percent of tax receipts and above 90 percent of all Spanish taxpayers recognized the existence of fiscal fraud. In addition, at the time the fiscal system provided ample tax evasion opportunities for the wealthy, there was no political will to prosecute fiscal fraud. In particular, tax evasion was not a criminal offense and evaders only received small administrative sanctions. After Franco's death, the first democratic elections took place in 1977 and were won by a center-right coalition (the UCD-Unión de Centro Democrático). overhauled with an emphasis on vertical equity and progressivity. Also important for the evolution of tax morale in this period, a major effort got under way to modernize the tax administration apparatus. These reforms in tax administration included the territorial reorganization of the tax agency, the computerization of services, upgraded professional careers for tax officials, and setting up other instruments for increasing voluntary taxpayer compliance and fighting tax evasion. 4 Following the Supreme Court ruling declaring unconstitutional the use of the "family" as the unit of taxation, the 1998 tax reform sought to slow down the pace of government growth, lower tax rates and broaden tax bases to increase economic efficiency and horizontal fairness, and in general to bring the Spanish tax system in line with the then existing reform trends in OECD countries.
As noted by Comin (2005) , the 1998 reform package represented an end to the Spanish welfare state even before the task had been completed. In a way, Spain was still trying to catch up with its European peers when the rules of the game shifted. Thus, the fiscal reforms of the first twenty years of democracy were now also in need of reform. Although many of these needed reforms were introduced by the Socialist government, some had to wait for the change in government. After the right-center Partido Popular ( Potentially more important for tax morale, these reforms worldwide were now accepting the limitations of significant income redistribution through progressive income taxes. The tax reforms initiated by the PP embraced all these principles. For example, tax rates on capital gains were reduced in 1996 and in 1998, and a new, more favorable, tax regime for small and medium sized companies was enacted in 1998. The PP reforms of the Personal Income Tax in the first years of the new millennium were further oriented to reducing the tax burden, especially at the low end of the income distribution; more visible were the reductions of marginal tax rates across the board, including the top rate. 5 Also important for how the PP's policies were perceived by taxpayers was the fact that the government at the time pursued strict budget discipline, generating low deficits or surpluses and the reduction of the outstanding public debt, in order to comfortably meet the EU's requirements in the Stability and Growth Pact.
Aside from these reforms, there were many other events that potentially shaped ordinary citizens' views of the state. These included the already mentioned coup attempt in 1981; a sizable bout of corruption by public officials, especially during the Last Socialist government; and a profound fiscal, administrative and political decentralization enabled by the 1978 Constitution. The state also had to contend with centrifugal separatist forces in the historical regions but especially in the Basque Country with significant levels of terrorist activity by ETA. On the side of general performance of the economy, the country witnessed massive privatization of state-owned enterprises and in other cases the closing of these enterprises and a significant rise in the unemployment rate. In spite of that, the Spanish economy continued to experience high rates of economic growth for most of the transition period.
Some data on tax morale in Spain
Spain is a particularly interesting country to analyze because there have been a number of major changes that have occurred in its system over the past 20-30 years. Whether some major changes such as these have served to increase or decrease tax morale is the focus of the present study. Isolating the reasons for possible differences in tax morale is not an easy task.
However, the existence of several data sets, the World Values Survey ( Spain, contrary to many other countries, participated in all these surveys. This brings us the unique opportunity of investigating the development of tax morale over time, as we have said, focusing on the four time periods 1981, 1990, 1995 and 1999-2000. 7 We use a multivariate analysis setting with several independent variables to better isolate a possible time effect.
The general question used in the surveys to assess the level of tax morale is: It should be noted that our tax morale variable is not free of biases. Subjective surveys are always prone to significant reporting errors. A taxpayer who has engaged in some illegal behavior in the past may tend to excuse (even justify) this kind of behavior and so declare a high tax morale. Furthermore, people might overstate their willingness to pay taxes, as there are no sanctions involved; similarly, individuals may be reluctant to respond honestly to a survey question, given the delicate nature of tax compliance. However, the way by which the tax morale variable is generated is less intrusive than if we were to ask more directly whether a person has or has not evaded taxes. A further advantage of our approach is that both the WVS and EVS data sets cover a wide variety of questions on different topics, which helps reduce framing effects that may be present in surveys based only on tax compliance questions.
We recognize that there may be advantages to working with a multi-item index instead of a single question to measure tax morale (see Kirchler 1997 Kirchler , 1999 . However, a single question approach also has the advantage of avoiding the problems associated with the construction of an index, especially regarding issues of measurement procedure, low correlation between the items included in the index, overall complexity, and so on.
Evolution of aggregate levels of tax morale
Before examining the determinants of individual tax morale using multiple regression analysis, it is instructive to examine the distribution of aggregate tax morale scores in Spain for the years 1981, 1990, 1995, and 1999/2000 . Figure 1 presents the mean values in these four time periods, calculated as the simple average across all individuals in the data sets. In our case, the natural cut-off point is at the value 1 because many respondents assert that cheating on tax is "never justified". Our TAX MORALE variable therefore takes the value 1 if the respondent says that cheating on tax is "never justified" and 0 otherwise. This justifies the use in the next section of a probit model to estimate the determinants of tax morale. We As mentioned, Figure 1 indicated that the natural cut-off point for TAX MORALE is at the value 1, showing that many respondents believe that cheating on taxes is never justifiable. We therefore utilize a probit estimation approach. 10 In the estimations we also use a weighting variable on all observations to adjust the data to reflect the national population.
In order to control for differences in the number of participants between the different time periods, the observations are also weighted to get an equal number of observations for each wave.
11 To obtain the quantitative impacts for each of the explanatory variables, below we calculate the marginal effects corresponding to each of the variables. One final issue with the data is that "I don't know" answers and missing values were omitted in all estimations.
In the regressions below we include a wide range of independent variables as determinants of TAX MORALE, although it is justifiable to state that further variables could have been included. However, using all four waves reduced the number of possible independent variables to include. There is no established theory on the determinants of tax morale that can guide us in the election of relevant explanatory variables. we include a set of variables representing individual human capital, such as employment status and so on. Third, we include a set of variables that measure the level of "social capital", measuring such things as trust in government institutions or the level of national pride. Our main interest is to establish whether, after controlling for these potential determinant factors of tax morale, the time dummy variables (TIME 1990 , TIME 1995 , TIME 1999 are still statistically significant. Given the important changes in the political regimes and the fiscal and economic environments over all these years, we expect the time dummies to be significant. Of course using time dummies does not allow us to identify what particular changes in fiscal policy and overall governance may have produced the changes in tax morale. In fact we cannot separate among any effects coming from those sources and any other changes that may have happened in Spanish society over the intervening years, other than those captured by our control variables. The descriptive statistics of the independent variables are presented in Appendix Table A1 .
The regression results are presented in Table 2 . As a test of robustness we report the results from a number of alternative specifications. In the basic specification, in column 1 of Table 2 , we introduce as control variables age, gender, marital status, and employment status.
In addition we include our variables of interest, the dummy variables to investigate time effects (with 1981 as the reference period): TIME 1990, TIME 1995 and TIME 1999.
The results for the control variables are in line with those found in previous studies in tax morale and tax evasion. A higher age is correlated with higher tax morale, although the marginal effects are small-less than one percentage point. We checked for non-linearity for 12 Previous studies have discussed the relevance of control variables. See, for example, Torgler ( , 2006b . 13 See, for example, Alm (1998) and Andreoni et al. (1998) .
age including a quadratic term, but the results clearly indicated that there is a linear relationship between age and tax morale. We also observe a significant effect for gender; the coefficient for FEMALE is positive and statistically significant in all regressions, with the marginal effects as high as 4 percentage points. On the other hand, the relationship between marital status and tax morale, with MARRIED status being the control group, is not a strong one; although SEPARATED and SINGLE individuals may show relatively lower tax morale than the control group, in most cases the estimated coefficients are not statistically significant.
Similar results are obtained for employment status. Although the estimated coefficients for SEL-FEMPLOYED and UNEMPLOYED are negative, which would show a lower level of tax morale than for the control group (full time employed), these coefficients are not statistically significant; therefore no differences in the level of tax morale are observable.
For the time effects, in the basic regression all coefficients are statistically significant which indicates that tax morale was at the lowest level in 1981. Thus, after controlling for other potential determinants of tax morale, our main finding is that tax morale in Spain was In the second specification (column 2 of Table 2 ), we further investigate whether the differences over time are largely driven by changes in the level of social capital. With that goal we add several variables to the basic specification; these social capital variables can be seen as indicating the extent to which citizens can identify themselves with the state, the national institutions or the country itself. The first variable in this group measures the degree of individuals' TRUST IN THE PARLIAMENT and thus is closely linked to the way taxpayers feel they are treated by the state. 14 As a proxy for national identification we use NATIONAL PRIDE. 15 Finally, as a measure of norms enforced by non-governmental institutions or values that promote compliance and punish misbehavior we use RELIGIOSITY. 16 We would expect that if the parliament is seen to be acting in a trustworthy way, taxpayers' trust in the state increases and so would their willingness to comply with their tax obligations. Identification with the state such as national pride may induce cooperation among taxpayers and thus induces similar mechanisms as the trust variables. Religiosity and the church as an institution induce behavioral norms and moral constraints among individuals.
Religiosity can thus be seen as a restriction on engaging in tax evasion (see Torgler 2006b ).
The empirical results indicate that social capital variables matter in determining tax morale.
The estimated coefficients for the three variables are positive and highly statistically
significant. An increase in religiosity by one unit increases the probability of stating tax evasion is never justifiable by not less than 8.5 percentage points. The variable PRIDE indicates marginal effects of more than 7.6 percentage points. This means that an increase in the pride scale by one unit increases the share of subjects indicating the highest tax morale by 7.6 percentage points. Finally, TRUST IN THE PARLIAMENT has also a positive impact on tax morale, with marginal effects of 3.1 percentage points. Using a Wald-test for coefficient restrictions testing for joint significance we can conclude that social capital plays a significant role in the determination of individuals' tax morale.
As can be seen from the second column of Table 2 , the time effects are still quite visible in the presence of social capital variables. All coefficients remain highly statistically significant; only the marginal effects of the strongest effect observable in 1995 decreases from 19.3 to 17.1 percentage points.
In the final specification (column 3 of Table 2 ) we add the economic status variables to the regressions. 17 The interesting result here is that "lowest economic status class" appears to have the highest tax morale, while the "upper class" has the lowest tax morale followed by the upper-middle and lower-middle classes, in that order. Being in the upper class rather than the lower class reduces the probability of stating that tax evasion is never justifiable by 7 These results are shown in Table 3 . For simplicity, we only report the time variables. Of course, the regression results are perfectly comparable to the findings presented in Table 2 and reproduce the results shown in Table 1 . We can observe a significant increase in tax morale between 1990 and 1995, but a decay of tax morale over time between 1995 and 1999/2000. On the other hand, the differences between 1990 and 1999/2000 are not statistically significant.
It is interesting to compare our results with those obtained by Prieto Rodríguez et al. (2005) use of political party affiliation variables. 18 These authors find that affiliation with the large mainstream parties is correlated with higher tax morale, especially for the case of the rightcentre party (Partido Popular); in contrast, affiliation with the nationalist regional parties is associated with lower tax morale. We believe that these two sets of results in the two papers are quite complementary in the sense that our variables "trust in parliament" and "pride of citizenship" are likely to be highly positively correlated with affiliation to the major countrywide parties as opposed to the case of regional nationalist parties. In addition, our variable "religiosity" is likely to be highly correlated with affiliation to centre-right Partido Popular. In the reference group are MALE, MARRIED, FULL TIME EMPLOYED, LOWEST CLASS, SPAIN 1981. Marginal effect = highest tax morale score (1). Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Conclusion
The transition and further consolidation of the democratic state in Spain and deep reforms of its fiscal system provide a quasi-natural experiment setting for studying evolution of citizens' attitudes toward paying taxes, or tax morale.
In this paper we analyze tax morale in remains somewhat of a puzzle although some likely causes include institutional changes such as corruption in the public sector, a perception of lower levels of tax fairness, or even high levels of unemployment in the economy.
There can be little doubt that the tremendous success of Spanish tax reforms and tax administration modernization efforts in practically doubling tax effort for general revenues in the country from 22 percent of GDP in 1976 to 39.9 percent of GDP in 2002 has a lot to do with improved tax morale of Spanish citizens. We have argued that the level of tax morale is an endogenous variable affected by, among other things, tax policy and tax administration reforms. Clearly, keeping tax morale high is a valuable asset for the entire country.
It is our hope that this paper will provoke further research on the evolution of tax morale in Spain and that future studies will be able to lead us to a better understanding of citizens' attitude toward paying taxes. Torgler, B. (2006b 
